“One person made a mistake by posting a video in a private chat where it shouldn’t have been shared. Another leaked it publicly for views. The masses got a beautiful picture—and the next group paid the price under fire at that same spot,” Howell wrote.

The strike reportedly targeted the E50 highway south of Pokrovsk, a route Russian infantry units have been using with light vehicles to push into the city. Russian troops, entering the city, were reportedly killed or wounded in the follow-up attacks.

Geoguessr: Russian Propadanda edition

A bit more info on a headline that went around, it is really amazing how robots like these are being used to genuinely make a difference in evacuating wounded.

This is a good summary of the current situation and how it got there in Pokrovsk. Admist a fear of missing the proper moment to begin a retreat and cede territory, which is of course a rational fear, I think it is easy to miss how much Russia's propaganda machine has been thrown off track by the timing of taking Pokrovsk not happening quickly in a manner that fits easily into a media package for propaganda.

By the time Russia can actually credibly claim they have taken Pokrovsk, the propaganda boom from looking strong will have faded into a messier reality. As a result the benefit in coming political negotiations will be far less for Russia than if they had decisively taken Pokrovsk and only made propaganda hay from it to the international community after they could somewhat credibly back up their claim over the city.

As the video says, Pokrovsk has done its job ...which isn't to trivialize the sacrifices made here but rather to emphasize that they were not in vain. Look at the numbers, look at how much Russia has lost and how much it has paid, to call the eventual capture of Pokrovsk a pyrrhic victory is to make an understatement. It is more correct to say the campaign to take Pokrovsk is a strategic loss on Russia's part that will be studied by militaries all over the world for decades.

Mirror

Ukrainian "long Neptunes." Making more 🇺🇦

https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16883

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Mirror

https://t.me/exilenova_plus/13824

Kremlin says Ukraine will have to negotiate with Russia 'sooner or later'

Flying bombs won't stay dumb forever, I think there will end up being some high profile cases where what appears to be a flying bomb is actually a trap for a manned interceptor, this already happened on the sea with a Ukranian boat being targeted by the shahed it was trying to shoot down (I think it was a shahed), though the gunner on the boat still successfully shot the shahed down.

No matter how this evolves, you know what I would really want to be in to hunt down and eliminate a mass wave of shaheds and drones that might try to threaten me back?

One of these

Or one of these

What is the shahed going to do? Try to turn around and fly at the helicopter? ... and then what? Have you ever seen how these types of helicopters move? There is no good reason these shouldn't be provided to help Ukraine immediately....

These platforms have sensors that can see for extremely long range, have an accurate direct fire cannon and can also mount all kinds of guided missiles, it really mystifies me why the world is acting like these wouldn't be extraordinarily useful to Ukraine right now as mass air defense platforms to protect large populations of civilians from flying bombs.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/10/15/ukraines-navy-doesnt-exist-except-it-kind-of-does-and-its-brilliant/

^ link to article where it mentions that a Ukrainian patrol boat was targeted by a shahed

Edit Italy also has the AW249 which would be extremely useful to Ukraine right now for the same reasons.

Mirror

https://t.me/exilenova_plus/13757

Not "Free" unfortunately but this is still a big area to watch, especially those AH-64s everyone is so convinced are "obsolete"... lol

Mirror

https://t.me/exilenova_plus/13739

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https://t.me/exilenova_plus/13741

This headline is annoying but the article is focused on the right thing. This is what Ukraine needs to get good at hunting down to decisively win the war on the tactical and operational level.

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Russian forces appear to be struggling to conduct successful ground assaults to take and hold additional ground despite having conducted a successful battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign and infiltration missions to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[6] The urban terrain of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is not conducive to mechanized, motorized, or mass infantry assaults intended to expand control of terrain, unlike Russian infiltration missions.

The Russian military command has dedicated better-trained and better-equipped units to BAI and infiltration missions than they have to ground assaults. Elite dedicated drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are responsible for interdicting Ukrainian logistics and downing Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction, and Spetsnaz elements are responsible for initial infiltration missions aimed at disorganizing Ukrainian defenses and creating holes for standard Russian infantry to exploit on subsequent infiltration missions.[7] Russian forces are also struggling to extend logistics that would more easily enable Russian infantry who have already infiltrated into Pokrovsk to consolidate positions and accumulate personnel for further assaults.[8]

...

The Russian military command has proven willing to tolerate the significant losses and time required for such campaigns.[10] The Russian military command may fear that reducing the Russian force presence or tempo of offensive operations anywhere else in the theater may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make gains or redeploy forces elsewhere. The Russian military command also likely seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are making substantial advances across the entire theater, contrary to the battlefield reality, and redeploying forces and means away from some areas of the front at the scale necessary to quickly collapse the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction would undermine this Russian narrative.[11]

Food for thought - What does an offensive about to fail look like? How will journalists and analysts not quite willing yet to challenge status quo narratives about the inveitability of the Russian offensive first describe it before the blossoming failure becomes undeniable?