Last December, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist militant group, launched a sudden offensive that sent shockwaves through the region. One by one, major cities began to fall—first Aleppo, then Hama, and soon Homs—as the rebels pushed their way closer to Damascus, Syria’s capital. President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which had survived well over a decade of civil war thanks to the likes of Iranian and Russian backing, found itself increasingly unable to deter the rebels’ advances; Iran was tangled up in its own proxy battles with Israel, while Russia was stretched thin with its war in Ukraine. In other words, Assad was on his own. The rebels, it seemed, understood this, and so they seized their chance. Damascus fell in a matter of days, and Assad fled to Moscow.
Initially, the ousting of Assad—a ruthless authoritarian notorious for using chemical weapons on his own people and overseeing a network of brutal political prisons, like the infamous “human slaughterhouse” at Sednaya—was widely celebrated across much of Syria.
While HTS and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa—now Syria’s de facto president—originated as an al-Qaeda affiliate with early ties to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, their story is more complicated, especially today. Since Assad’s fall, Sharaa has undergone a strategic political makeover, rebranding himself as a moderate who promises to form an inclusive government that represents the country’s mosaic of different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. The move to distance himself from his jihadist past is a calculated political one aimed at convincing the world — particularly the U.S. and Europe—to lift sanctions on Syria, the harshest of which have been in place since the start of the civil war in 2011. The oil, construction, and banking sectors have taken an especially hard blow, which, in turn, has stymied efforts to rebuild both Syria’s infrastructure and economy. If Sharaa is successful in convincing global powers of his reformed government, it could give Syria a chance to address its hyperinflation and widespread poverty as well as regain the public’s trust.
And to be fair, Sharaa’s new government has made some notable moves as of late. It appointed several women to key positions, including Maysaa Sabreen as the first-ever female head of Syria’s Central Bank, Aisha al-Dibs to lead the newly established Women’s Affairs Office, and Mushina al-Mahithawi, the first woman to ever serve as governor of Suwaida.
Still, some remain worried that Sharaa’s new government might revert to the strict, conservative Sharia law–style governance it imposed while controlling Idlib during the war.
The woman I spoke to at the bar most definitely felt this way. She said that at least under Assad, women had the legal right to vote, access to education, and could work. HTS-controlled Idlib, however, was a different story. Women’s rights were largely erased. Political participation was nonexistent, while social and economic freedom was severely restricted. Education, too, was gender-segregated and revolved primarily around religious studies.