Every issue with tp link has been. You need to have acces to the router physically to implement.
Come on, this is not true and you know it. Finding a counterexample was easy:
https://www.anavem.com/en/news/cybersecurity/tp-link-patches-critical-router-flaws-enabling-rce
Auth bypass + auth rce flaw. Literal remote code execution, instant own.
The problem with network appliances/routers is that they all have web ui's, and management api's or something of the sort. Web UI's are extremely complex services, with lots of difficult to secure attack surface. In a router, that attack surface is now running as root (because it has to be, to manage linux (or freebsd, routers are usually based on one of the two) kernel routing and networking.
So literally every single network appliance and router has had it's own critical vulnerabilities, even open source ones like openwrt.
The real solution here is to recognize that web interfaces are a security nightmare, and to either disable them or lock them behind ssh.
(Open)ssh, is known for having extremely few vulnerabilities, only 2.5 critical ones over it's 25+ years of existence. That's a big difference compared to some of these network appliances/routers which have 2+ critical vulns every quarter.


Randomized interface ports change nothing except for stopping automated scanners. They don't really help. Just lock it behind ssh, physical access or similar, and then never worry about it again.
No, all of the local web interfaces have had problems too. Literally every router or network appliance has had similar issues.
ISP, consumer, and enterprise routers have all the same issues due to the same architecture. All of them.
Me too. But it's just not about my router being secure today, it's about it being secure tomorrow. I want to be able to rest easy knowing that if a new vulnerability appears in xyz component then I don't have to worry about it.