Void auth, or kanidm look like easier alternatives.
I have installed an OS onto just the btrfs root subvolume, leaving the home directory intact. This is how I originally swapped from Manjaro to Arch. The arch manual install instructions helped.
But this should be a feature of the graphical installers imo.
Transparent fileystem compression and deduplication (btrfs feature not in ext4) compresses data while still having it be accessible normally. This leads to big space savings.
You can use the tool compsize to check it out.
Flatpak sandboxing uses bubblewrap, which uses seccomp and can filter syscalls.
LXD/Incus can run qemu-kvm virtual machines in addition to containers. In fact, I like the security posture of LXD/Incus better here because they use cgroups, namespaces, seccomp, to sandbox the qemu process, which libvirt also does but proxmox does not.
I like ORM's because they prevent sql injection. Mostly. Sql injection is a really bad vuln that's nowhere near as ubiqitous as it used to be for every php app, and that's partly due to ORM's.
It's all about control. They demand control over servers, not allowing you to self host. They also demand control over communities, by putting them all in one big server or other controlled channels (but sometimes refusing to properly moderate them like in league of legends).
Now, they want to control your device.
Sometimes I wonder if Vanguard is actually a government pet project for practice blocking and executing malicious pci devices.
You take one of those pci dma cheat cards, put a modem in them, and you've broken secure boot. And nation states have done such a thing to compromise laptops or other devices after getting physical access to them for a bit.
They do it though. People all of a sudden are motivated and able to enable bitlocker and secure boot and update their bios when they need it to play le funni video game.
https://www.riotgames.com/en/news/vanguard-security-update-motherboard
I am so deeply annoyed that
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Vanguard demands this level of control over user systems
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Vanguard seems to be the only entity handling a threat vector most people simply ignore. I suspect not even crowdstrike and the like could handle malicious pci devices. Well, vanguard can't either, it's just a cat and mouse game. But they are definitely trying in an area where most seem to have given up, but it's absurd that it's a fucking game anticheat that's doing this.
Debian repos are basically guaranteed safe: https://programming.dev/comment/22863237
Flathub is much, much safer than say, the google play store, but it ultimately does follow a model of app developers submitting packages which get reviewed and approved. In theory, someone could sneak malware past that, although there haven't been any incidents (perhaps flathub's review is very effective?). But the snap store, which follows a similar model has had malware. But canonical hasn't been the best steward of that one.
In addition to this, not all stuff on flathub is open source, which is definitely concerning.
Thankfully, flatpak has a built in sandboxing system, which lets you limit what the appps have access to. KDE has a UI for it, and there is also the GUI app flatseal.
Journalists communicating with sources in censored regions
Whistleblowers sharing information securely
You and your peer agree on an encryption key (any string).
This is unacceptably unsecure for the usecases you mention. There is a reason why the most secure messaging apps don't use symetric encryption, don't use passphrases, and they also possess forward secrecy.
It's pointless to push this as a censhorship circumvention method when many other methods exist that already do so 10x better, in a secure way, over decentralized, hidden and unblockable infrastructure. (Tor's meek-azure bridges use microsoft's infrastructure, which nobody is able to block because everybody depends on it, even China).
I appreciate the project, and I am always happy to see people learning, progressing, and publishing their results, but you need to be honest about the weaknesses of your software compared to established solutions. It's not impossible for you to one day produce a secure messaging app, but today is not the day. Right now, using this is just a fast way to get killed.

Nuitka is interesting. The articlenotes that it compiles python to bytecode, instead of bundling an interpreter, which is true.
But what the article doesn't mention is that Nuitka has a paid version, which includes a feature of code/binary obfuscation, in order to make reverse engineering more difficult. I wonder if hackers used the paid version?