University of Nottingham has confirmed a major breach of its Campus Solutions system, with ShinyHunters claiming responsibility. Around 454,600 students and alumni were reportedly affected, with exposed data including names, emails, addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, ethnicity/disability information, academic enrolment records, and fee/payment details. The suspected attack vector is Oracle PeopleSoft, a platform widely used by universities for student records and administration. Nottingham says it detected the incident on June 9, 2026, took systems offline, notified affected users, reported it to the ICO and Action Fraud, and launched a forensic investigation.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/47960526

The Miasma supply chain worm just went open source. Here's an analysis of it... Initial observations - 5-layer obfuscation, GitHub-as-C2, AI tool config hijacking, dead-man switches, and a self-perpetuating PAT flywheel.

The Miasma supply chain worm just went open source. Here's an analysis of it... Initial observations - 5-layer obfuscation, GitHub-as-C2, AI tool config hijacking, dead-man switches, and a self-perpetuating PAT flywheel.

Most people judge messaging apps using one checkbox: “Does it have end-to-end encryption?” That sounds reasonable, but it is incomplete.

End-to-end encryption protects the content of your messages. It does not automatically protect your metadata, your identity, your contact graph, your IP address, your registration details, or the fact that you are using a particular app in the first place. And in many real-world cases, metadata is more dangerous than message content (ex - iOS storing notifications in cleartext in an easily accessible folder for sometime)

That is why this analysis uses LINDDUN, a privacy threat modeling framework developed to evaluate privacy risks instead of just technical security risks. Unlike STRIDE, which focuses on system security threats, LINDDUN looks at privacy problems like linkability, identifiability, detectability, data disclosure, and whether users are misled about what is actually happening. The results are far from what most people expect

Apps like Briar and Cwtch score at the top because they avoid central servers and route communications through Tor. There is no company owned server...no central message database to subpoena. There is no phone number registration system tying your account to you.

SimpleX Chat is also very strong because it removes user identifiers entirely. Instead of having a permanent phone number, username, or account ID, conversations are built around one-time invitation links and separate message queues.

Threema is a strong practical option because it does not require a phone number or email address. It uses a random Threema ID, making it much harder to tie your messaging identity to your real-world identity.

Session improves metadata protection by routing messages through its Oxen Service Node Network, although thet his network is younger and less tested than Tor.

For most users, Signal is the best practical recommendation. It has excellent encryption, strong transparency practices, and a nonprofit structure. But it still requires a phone number for registration.

Now, some apps which are supposed to perform well in terms of privacy but they don't.

Telegram performs much worse than its privacy reputation suggests. Regular Telegram chats are NOT END TO END ENCRYPTED by default and chats are stored on Telegram’s servers. Secret Chats exist, but they are optional and limited.

WhatsApp uses the Signal Protocol for message encryption which is good. But because it belongs to Meta, the metadata and ecosystem-level tracking risks remain serious. Message content may be protected, but the user fingerprint can be easily tracked by meta services even without them having access to chat content.

Discord is not a private messaging app. It stores text chats on its servers and is better treated as a public or semi-public community platform.

SMS and RCS are at the bottom. They provide almost no meaningful privacy protection and should not be used for sensitive communication.

The safest messaging app is not just the one that encrypts your messages. It is the one that collects the least data, links the least metadata, requires the least identity, and has the least ability to betray you later.

No app can protect you from bad operational security, compromised devices, or careless contacts. But choosing the right app can remove a huge amount of structural surveillance from your daily communication.