It's been working fine for 20+ years already, with consequences foreseen from the beginning:

• Don't trust exit nodes, they get the final packets and can do with them whatever they want.
• If you put identifying data in an unencrypted packet, the exit node will know who you are.
• If you send identifying data (encrypted or not) to a website, the website will know who you are.
• Trust destination websites only barely more than you'd trust them normally, and only as long as you keep the NoScript enabled.
• If your entry node colludes with your exit node, they might analyze data traffic patterns to try and identify you.

If you want to hide your porn habits from your techie flatmate with a logging router, Tor works great. If you're a CIA agent in Iran wanting to send some report back home without getting found out, Tor works great. If you're a whistleblower wanting to send an anonymous tip to the Washington Post, Tor also works great. If you're curious to see that foreign mercenary group's website that's blocked in your country... SWIM had to try some different circuits, but Tor also worked there.

What do you mean? The exit nodes runners are doing the heavy lifting here. It's fair for them to do everything technically possible to avoid unwanted raids.

Lol

I mean it's an exit node and the open web you don't really get to complain about lack of privacy when leaving Tor.

OTOH, there's a simple problem: That traffic is still likely encrypted. It's not like Tor exit nodes do the TLS handshake, do they? That would indeed be much stranger than applying traffic shaping.