What is the threat model where this matters? You have to trust the recipient with Signal. The only one I can think of is the case where your recipient is using a compromised fork and is unaware. In this case, talking about the tool and checking with them about what they are using is really the only countermeasure.
Yeah, that's a good point. For me it's mostly family that is not very technical, so I'm not too concerned of them using a fork.
In no way does Signal prevent conversations from being archived. For all you know, a recipient could be screenshotting all of your messages, and they could even be using the official app when doing so.
If you don't trust your contacts, probably shouldn't be messaging them anything sensitive.
Yes of course. Signal can archive messages and they can be restored, you can screenshot messages and you can have them backed up as part of a policy like icloud backups.
My question is more about how do you know you're interacting with an authentic signal client, and not a bastardized one.
At the moment you can't. The only realistic way I could see that happening is if the servers would check the app's digital signature and refuse the app from communicating with the official infrastructure if it didn't match.
Which would be absolutely disgusting given that Signal's official app lacks some basic functionality!
Yeah, I use the molly fork because there's features I like about it. I'd be sad if I couldn't use it anymore. :(
What are the ones you're after specifically?
I'm not totally sure signal has it, but I like the ram shredding and socks proxy. I know molly isn't fit for everyone's threat model but those two features I do like to see so I use it instead; I've not run into any issues with it.
Even then, nothing stops the client from lying to the server.
That's the point of digitally signing the app, to ensure its authenticity and integrity. TM and others wouldn't be able to resign the modified app with the Signal Foundation signature.
EDIT: Yeah after thinking more about it it's not a trivial problem, as you need to assume that the endpoint is inherently untrusted.
It's actually possible in a way:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/SafetyNet
But you necessarily need to limit the devices and operating systems that are allowed. No custom ROMs, no root access, etc.
It's bullshit and breaks open computing as a concept.
Not to mention that a device that would pass Play Integrity is precisely the device I wouldn't ever consider doing anything private on. Which would defeat the whole point of Signal. It's already bad enough that it's so desktop-unfriendly while much fewer phones than computers that can run non-privacy-invasive OSes than computers...
Isn't that just delegating trust to a third party, e.g. here Google? It's not as if Google was somehow immune to 0 days.
Fuck Safetynet and Play Integrity.
how do you know you’re interacting with an authentic signal client, and not a bastardized one.
I don't think that's the point... it does not matter. Even if it's an authentic client, if the device (e.g. 0 day vulnerability on the OS) or the user (e.g. does not lock their phone while going to the bathroom) is compromised, your conversation is not secure.
Signal isn't that kind of app. It protects your data in flight, but only has minimal protections after the recipient gets the message. It's a whole other game to protect data at the endpoint. If you can't trust your recipients to protect data, then you shouldn't send them data needing protection. In order to do that you need control over all levels of the device receiving the data, hardware, operating system, file system, and software. Anything else will always leave openings for data at rest at tge destination to be compromised by untrustworthy recipients.
No. Even if they were, the are plenty of ways to capture the messages.
Definitely. Capturing the messages isn't my concern though as much as interacting with non authentic clients
I mean... you do know someone can just take a screenshot, right?
And even if you use the Android thing that blocks screenshots, they can still take a photo with another phone.
You need to trust the other person for there to be any "privacy".
It's their computing and their devices, not yours.
Well yes, anyone can compile its own version of Signal and use it and it will work as long as there aren't some major changes to its communication protocol
Any signal conversation can be archived
I'm out of the loop what's going on?
Some photographer took a picture of a politician in the Trump admin using a Signal clone. That signal clone allowed the user to archive chats to a third party.
Thanks, that's.....interesting. He doesn't seem like the type to find and try obscure apps for fun
This hole question slounda like a screenshot!
Screenahot? Yes! Stole data now? Yup!
Privacy has become a very important issue in modern society, with companies and governments constantly abusing their power, more and more people are waking up to the importance of digital privacy.
In this community everyone is welcome to post links and discuss topics related to privacy.
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