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Can I refuse MS Authenticator?
(lemmy.ml)
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I work in cybersecurity for a large company, which also uses the MS Authenticator app on personal phones (I have it on mine). I do get the whole "Microsoft bad" knee-jerk reaction. I'm typing this from my personal system, running Arch Linux after accepting the difficulties of gaming on Linux because I sure as fuck don't want to deal with Microsoft's crap in Windows 11. That said, I think you're picking the wrong hill to die on here.
In this day and age, Two Factor Authentication (2FA) is part of Security 101. So, you're going to be asked to do something to have 2FA working on your account. And oddly enough, one of the reasons that the company is asking you to install it on your own phone is that many people really hate fiddling with multiple phones (that's the real alternative). There was a time, not all that long ago, where people were screaming for more BYOD. Now that it can be done reasonably securely, companies have gone "all in" on it. It's much cheaper and easier than a lot of the alternatives. I'd love to convince my company to switch over to Yubikeys or the like. As good as push authentication is, it is still vulnerable to social engineering and notification exhaustion attacks. But, like everything in security, it's a trade off between convenience, cost and security. So, that higher level of security is only used for accessing secure enclaves where highly sensitive data is kept.
As for the "why do they pick only this app", it's likely some combination of picking a perceived more secure option and "picking the easiest path". For all the shit Microsoft gets (and they deserve a lot of it), the authenticator app is actually one of the better things they have done. SMS and apps like Duo or other Time based One Time Password (TOTP) solutions, can be ok for 2FA. But, they have a well known weakness around social engineering. And while Microsoft's "type this number" system is only marginally better, it creates one more hurdle for the attacker to get over with the user. As a network defender, the biggest vulnerability we deal with is the interface between the chair and the keyboard. The network would be so much more secure if I could just get rid of all the damned users. But, management insists on letting people actually use their computers, so we need to find a balance where users have as many chances as is practical to remember us saying "IT will never ask you to do this!" And that extra step of typing in the number from the screen is putting one more roadblock in the way of people just blinding giving up their credentials. It's a more active thing for the user to do and may mean they turn their critical thinking skills on just long enough to stop the attack. I will agree that this is a dubious justification, but network defenders really are in a state of throwing anything they can at this problem.
Along with that extra security step, there's probably a bit of laziness involved in picking the Microsoft option. Your company picked O365 for productivity software. While yes, "Microsoft bad" the fact is they won the productivity suite war long, long ago. Management won't give a shit about some sort of ideological rejection of Microsoft. As much as some groups may dislike it, the world runs on Microsoft Office. And Microsoft is the king of making IT's job a lot easier if IT just picks "the Microsoft way". This is at the heart of Extend, Embrace, Extinguish. Once a company picks Microsoft for anything, it becomes much easier to just pick Microsoft for everything. While I haven't personally set up O365 authentication, I'm willing to bet that this is also the case here. Microsoft wants IT teams to pick Microsoft and will make their UIs even worse for IT teams trying to pick "not Microsoft". From the perspective of IT, you wanting to do something else creates extra work for them. If your justification is "Microsoft bad", they are going to tell you to go get fucked. Sure, some of them might agree with you. I spent more than a decade as a Windows sysadmin and even I hate Microsoft. But being asked to stand up and support a whole bunch because of shit for one user's unwillingness to use a Microsoft app, that's gonna be a "no". You're going to need a real business justification to go with that.
That takes us to the privacy question. And I'll admit I don't have solid answers here. On Android, the app asks for permissions to "Camera", "Files and Media" and "Location". I personally have all three of these set to "Do Not Allow". I've not had any issues with the authentication working; so, I suspect none of these permissions are actually required. I have no idea what the iOS version of the app requires. So, YMMV. With no other permissions, the ability of the app to spy on me is pretty limited. Sure, it might have some sooper sekret squirrel stuff buried in it. But, if that is your threat model, and you are not an activist in an authoritarian country or a journalist, you really need to get some perspective. No one, not even Microsoft is trying that hard to figure out the porn you are watching on your phone. Microsoft tracking where you log in to your work from is not all that important of information. And it's really darned useful for cyber security teams trying to keep attackers out of the network.
So ya, this is really not a battle worth picking. It may be that they have picked this app simply because "no one ever got fired for picking Microsoft". But, you are also trying to fight IT simplifying their processes for no real reason. The impetus isn't really on IT to demonstrate why they picked this app. It is a secure way to do 2FA and they likely have a lot of time, effort and money wrapped up in supporting this solution. But, you want to be a special snowflake because "Microsoft bad". Ya, fuck right off with that shit. Unless you are going to take the time to reverse engineer the app and show why the company shouldn't pick it, you're just being a whiny pain in the arse. Install the app, remove it's permissions and move on with life. Or, throw a fit and have the joys of dealing with two phones. Trust me, after a year or so of that, the MS Authenticator app on your personal phone will feel like a hell of a lot better idea.
You're god damn right they are, and they have every right to be. I'm in It too and I'm absolutely sick of the condescending attitude and downright laziness of people in the field who constantly act like what the users want doesn't matter. If they don't want it on their personal device, they don't need a damn reason.
This job is getting easier all the time, complaining because users don't want Microsoft trash on their phone might make marginally more work for you is exactly as whiny.
I see this all the time and it's downright hysterical. Who the hell can't handle having to have two devices on them?
"Oh yeah you'll regret asking for this! Just wait till you have to pull out that other thing in your bag occasionally! You'll be sorry you ever spoke up!"
Also, develop some pattern recognition. If you can't see how Microsoft makes this substantially worse once other methods have been choked out, you haven't learned a thing about them in the last 30 years.
Sure, and I suspect they company will have another option for folks who either can't or won't put the application on their personal device. It's probably also going to be far less convenient for the user. Demanding that the company implement the user's preferred option is where the problem arises.
It's a matter of scale. In a company of any size, you are going to find someone who objects to almost anything. This user doesn't like Microsoft. Ok, let's implement Google. Oh wait, the user over there doesn't like Google. This will go on and on until the IT department is supporting lots of different applications and each one will have a non-zero cost in time and effort. And each of those "small things" has a way of adding up to a big headache for IT. We live in a world of finite resources, and IT departments are usually dealing with even more limited resources. At some point they have to be able to cut their losses and say, "here are the officially supported solutions, pick one". While this creates issues for individuals throughout the organization, it's usually small issues, spread out over lots of people versus lots of small issues concentrated in one group.
If you're in IT, you've likely seen (and probably supported) this sort of standardization in action. I can't count the number of places where every system is some flavor of Dell or HP. And the larger organizations usually have a couple of standard configurations around expected use case. You're an office worker, here's a basic laptop with 16Gb of RAM, and mid level CPU and fuck all for a GPU. Developer? Right, here's the top end CPU, as much RAM as we can stuff in the box and maybe a discreet GPU. AI/ML work? here's the login for AWS. Edge cases will get dealt with in a one-off fashion, there's always going to be the random Mac running around the network, but support will always be sketchy for those. It's all down to standardizing on a few, well known solutions to make support and troubleshooting easier. Sure, there are small shops out there willing to live with beige box deployments. Again, that does not scale.
Hey, if that's your thing, great. But, there is a reason BYOD took off. And a lot of that was on users pushing for it. Having been on the implementation side, it certainly wasn't IT or security departments pushing for this. BYOD is still a goddamn nightmare from an insider threat perspective. And it causes no end of headaches for Help Desks trying to support FSM knows what ancient piece of crap someone dredges up from the depths of history. Yes, it's a bit of cop out to give the user a crappy solution, because they push back against the easy one. But, it's also a matter of trying to keep things working in a standardized fashion. A standard configuration phone, with the required pre-installed, gives the user the option they want and also keeps IT from having do deal with yet more non-standard systems. It's a win for everyone, even if it's not the win the user wanted.
I do understand how bad Microsoft can be. I was an early adopter of Windows Me. And also have memories of Microsoft whining about de-coupling IE from the OS. And I don't want MS to win out as the authentication app for everyone. That said, I still believe that the Microsoft Authenticator app on a personal device is the wrong hill to die on. There is a lot of non-Microsoft software out there and there are plenty of options out there. But, Microsoft software using the Microsoft app isn't surprising or insidious.
Hillary Clinton
This is incredibly well said and I agree 100%. I'll just add that software TOTP is weaker than the MS Authenticator with number matching because the TOTP seed can still be intercepted and/or stolen by an attacker.
Ever notice that TOTP can be backed up and restored to a new device? If it can be transferred, then the device no longer counts for the "something you have" second factor in my threat model.
While I prefer pure phishing-resistant MFA methods (FIDO2, WHFB, or CBA), the support isn't quite there yet for mobile devices (especially mobile browsers) so the MS Authenticator is the best alternative we have.
The administrator can restrict this.
We can restrict the use of software TOTP, which is what companies are doing when they move users onto the MS Authenticator app.
Admins can't control the other TOTP apps like Google Authenticator or Authy unless they go full MDM. And I don't think someone worried about installing the MS Authenticator app is going to be happy about enrolling their phone in Intune.
Edit: And even then, there is no way to control or force users to use a managed device for software TOTP.
No, you can actually block them from adding additional devices. Once they add a TOTP device, they can not add or change to another without admin approval.
But more to the point, if the admin requires the management of the authentication software, I.e. Bitwarden or authy or whatever, then they clearly have concerns about the security of the MFA on the user's device. If text messages are no longer considered secure then we move to the TOTP apps, but now if we're just summarily deciding the apps are no longer considered secure, we're demanding a secure app controlled by the admin must be used for MFA.
Can we not see where this is going next? Are we really under the delusion that because we have this magical Microsoft Authentication app now, MFA need never become more secure? This is the end of the road, nothing else will be asked of the user ever again?
If the concern is for the security of MFA on the user's side of that equation, then trying to manage that security on a device that company does not own is a waste of time. Eventually this is not going to be enough.
So let's just skip this step entirely and move on to fully controlled company devices used for MFA.
Look man, it's okay to be wrong. It's a natural part of growth.
But when you double down on your ignorance instead of taking the opportunity to open your mind and listen to the experts in the room, you just end up embarrassing yourself.
Try to be better.
To add on, at my work we started getting yubikeys for the people who didnt want Microsoft's authenticator on their phone and found they still need to download the mfa to set up the yubikey in the first place. So its not a perfect solution if you dont want the authenticator to touch your phone at all.
I can also confirm that the help desk members who are not enlightened about Microsoft will ridicule you for not wanting the MFA even if its reasonable to not want Microsoft on your phone. As much as we think all techs are Linux nerds, I have the opposite at my work. Some of the higher up techs are constantly trying to get people to switch to windows 11...
When I got the few emails from users at my organization who refused to use the app on their phones, I was ecstatic and I went to bat for them with our section director who insisted on making it mandatory, no exceptions.
Unfortunately most people in IT seem to just be lazy and believe "if it makes my job easier, absolutely no other concerns are relevant".
Hey now, this doesn't fit with our narrative of the evil evil company here. Get this out of here! Just because it's a 2FA app doesn't negate that it's microshitz!
Fuck me I wish we could get more of these actual thoughtful answers instead of generic "hurdurr muh privacy megacorp bad"
All extremely good reasons to need the MFA.
Howerver it is on the company to provide the hardware. My phone is my phone. They didn't buy it, they don't pay for it, they don't get any say in what gets installed. I don't have to pay for my company provided computer either, so I don't care what they need me to install on that.
And that's completely fair. As I said above, the end result will almost certainly be a company provided phone with company provided apps. I've seen (and had) both solutions. It all comes down to how you view the risks. If you see running a Microsoft app on your personal phone as too great a risk to your privacy, then go for the two phone option. Personally, I don't see that as a high risk and think it's kinda silly.
You work in cybersecurity, yet you have company-controlled assets on your personal phone?
X DOUBT
Either you don’t give a single sh*t about your personal privacy, or…
And no, this isn’t “Microsoft bad”, this is “your company is inherently and fundamentally untrustworthy”. The app is, IMHO, one of the best ones out there, I would just never trust any company I worked for to keep their nose out of my personal life. A lot of the software that companies use to lock down mobile devices are hella invasive, and any company asset on a phone typically includes a demand to install the security software as well. Any of that shit should ALWAYS be on a company-provided phone, bro.
Here's the rub, I've been through enough of this to take a realistic, risk based approach to security. Knee-jerk reactions like the one you are giving are not really useful. Step back for a moment and think about what's going on here. First and foremost, this isn't MDM on a device, that's entirely different from installing the MS Authenticator app from the public Google Play store and adding a work account to it. So no, the company is not able to go rooting around in the user's device willy-nilly. Second, even with MDM, IT control of the user's device isn't what it used to be. Google implemented containerization of work profiles some time back. Without Work Profiles and containerization, I would agree that enrolling my personal device in MDM carries too much risk to my privacy and also having my device remote wiped. But, the advance of technology has altered that calculus. While there are still risks to consider with having a work profile on my device, it's also not as worrisome as it used to be.
Security isn't some binary thing. There is no hard and fast set of rules, given from some entity on high. It's a game of deciding what risks are acceptable and what risks need to be mitigated and how. If you work for a company which you believe is trying to use MDM to go rooting around in your personal device, I'd suggest finding an new job. This isn't to say you should trust the company 100%; but, you need to take a realistic look at what the ask is, what risks it carries and if the trade-off in convenience is worth it. The risks inherent in the MS Authenticator app are basically nil. At least on Android, you can audit it's permissions and disable the ones you don't want it to have. The app provides zero control over the device to the company. Really, there's just nothing there to get your panties in a bunch about.
But hey, if knee-jerk reactions are your thing, then you do you. This whole tempest in a teapot still amounts to "Microsoft bad".