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The OTP you want to use was already used
(lemmy.ml)
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this post was submitted on 23 Sep 2023
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Although it's true that you are increasing the attack surface when compared to locally stored OTP keys, in the context of OTPs, it doesn't matter. It still is doing it's job as the second factor of authentication. The password is something you know, and the OTP is something you have (your phone/SIM card).
I would argue it is much worse what 1Password and Bitwarden (and maybe others?) allows the users to do. Which is to have the both the password and the OTP generator inside the same vault. For all intents and purposes this becomes a single factor as both are now something you know (the password to your vault).
That’s not quite right though, there’s the factor you know (password to your vault), and the factor you have (a copy of the encrypted vault).
Admittedly, I don’t use that feature either, but, it’s not as bad as it seems at first glance.
That would be true for offline vaults, but for services hosted on internet I don't think so. Assuming the victim does not use 2FA on their Bitwarden account, all an attacker needs is the victim's credentials (email and password). Once you present the factor you know, the vault is automatically downloaded from their services.
This is something I hadn't thought until know, but I guess password managers might(?) change the factor type from something you know (the password in your head) to something you have (the vault). At which point, if you have 2FA enabled on other services, you are authenticating with 2 things you have, the vault and your phone.
A pretty tall assumption given that we're already talking about someone who knows to turn on 2FA for other things. If someone knows about 2FA and password managers, they'd be insane not to have 2FA set up on the password manager itself.
That's a fair point. I just wanted to highlight that there may be cases where a password manager isn't automatically protected by 2FA by the two factors you mentioned (The password you know and the copy of the vault) since in the case of bitwarden fulfilling one can give you the second. In order to actually achieve 2FA in this case, you would need to enable OTPs.
Certainly fair.
And yeah, I personally use Bitwarden with 2FA on the Bitwarden account, but don't store any 2FA tokens in Bitwarden, handling them all separately. Don't want all the eggs in one basket.
Though given I have fingerprint access on phone and computer for bitwarden, i suppose that one basket is my finger. But if someone is taking my finger, I've got more immediate concerns than my passwords.
It works for self hosted vaultwarden mostly also. Since you would need a way to acess the login page itself, which could be behind a VPN or other authentication service like Authentik.
This is why we require second factor on the password manager too, otherwise you’re exactly right.
Many password managers use a biometric factor to sign in (your fingerprint, for example, using some kind of auth app if needed). This basically moves the MFA aspect to one service (your password manager) instead of having each service do their own thing. It also comes with the benefits of password managers - each password can be unique, high entropy, and locked behind MFA.
The only thing this does is replace the authentication mechanism used to unlock the vault, instead of using your master password (something you know), it uses some biometric factor (something you are), although it uses your biometric data, it's still a single factor of authentication
I am not sure I understood you here. What do you mean by "instead of having each service do their own thing"? Each website using their own method of delivering OTPs?
I am not discrediting password managers, they have their uses, as you mention you can have unique, high entropy password on a per service basis. The only thing I am against is the password managers themselves also doubling as OTPs generators (take a look at Bitwarden Authenticator which kinda defeats the purpose of OTPs. From the perspective of OTPs it makes much more sense to use a separate application (Like Google Authenticator or Aegis Authenticator), preferably on a separate device, to generate the OTPs.
Speaking from my experience, I use my phone for biometric authentication. At least from my point of view, I see that as two factors (what I have and what I am) since the biometric authentication only works on my phone.
Basically having multiple places where codes may be generated. This way you can use one location to get OTPs instead of having them delivered via SMS or generated by a different app/service. It ends up being easier and more convenient for the end user (which of course increases adoption).
I guess this has more to do with services adopting OTP generators than sending them via SMS though.
If logging into the password manager to get the password is sufficiently secure (locked behind MFA), then I don't see the benefit of using a separate OTP generator (aside from maybe if your password manager has a data breach or something, which should be a non-issue except it clearly isn't thanks to LastPass...)
I'm starting to wonder if phones (or other auth-specific devices) should just become dedicated authentication devices and passwords should just be phased out entirely tbh. Passwords have always had issues because their static nature means if someone learns your password without your knowledge, that method of authentication becomes worthless. The main concern would be what happens when you lose your phone I suppose.