Because you can't count on every instance playing by the rules. If anyone can set up an instance and authenticate any federated account, then they could also choose to impersonate me.
I won’t pretend I looked into authentication algorithm of every fedi apps but I doubt it’s “trust me bro” algorithm. Otherwise what would prevent malicious instance to post from your name today. Even if it’s some wacky algorithm it’s not a rocket science to enhance it. Message signing and public key sharing is one of common ways to solve this kind of problems. The only reason I see not to do it is lack of will or resources, or both
To explain why the comment below is correct, you are right that the other instance couldn't get your password. They don't need that to create a post/comment that is supposedly sent from an account though. Those aren't cryptographically signed or anything like that. It just says "this user sent this message".
I don't even think there is a way you could do this with some kind of cryptographic signature, unless it basically just sends an encrypted message to the home server and it verifies it, which then we have the same issue we started with of relying on a single server. I guess every message could be sent with a key, which can be disputed later. If the home server is unavailable, the message is sent, but it can later say that it's a forgery when it comes back online. It's not a perfect fix, but it's the only way this could even possibly work I think.
User registers at home server. Client generates pair of public and private keys, password provided by user during registration is used to encrypt (symmetrically) private key. Public and encrypted private keys stored on home server and then propagate over federation to other servers. Obviously propagation takes some time. Just like anything that uses ActivityPub (don’t know why I have to say it explicitly). Original private key not recorded anywhere. User initiates login on federated server. Federated server challenges user by providing encrypted private key and challenge phrase. User uses password to decrypt private key on client side and signs message with challenge phrase. Server uses public key to validate signature and phrase. User logged in. User creates signed post. All federated servers have copy of public key so they can check authenticity of origin of post.
I’m not saying it’s easy or perfect. I have no idea how feasible it is in current architecture. Probably there’s a smarter and more secure way to do it. I’m also not a team of security engineers who is getting paid to get this kind of things designed professionally.
My point is that, I think, it’s more of willingness issue than technical.
The only reason signatures work is because only your home instance can post as you. If you're saying you want any instance to be able to authenticate any user, even if all the rest of the fediverse is down, then you're eliminating that trust anchor (i.e., your home instance).
Currently, a malicious instance could pretend to post as any of ITS users, but NOT external users. The problem is if that instance is able to authenticate someone from a different instance, an you're suggesting. Then, they could post as that user and propagate that action through federation.
The only way this could work is if YOU as the user had a public/private key your on YOUR device(s). Then, any action made on your behalf could first be required to be signed LOCALLY on YOUR device.
Problems with that approach are:
Key management: Using the fediverse on multiple devices
Trust: Where do I "register" my public keys? Again, you need some trusted third party/parties, which defeats your idea of absolute decentralization. Who decides which key store instances are to be trusted? How does the registration work? For example, what if you have two such public key stores (decentralization much) that either don't federated together or they take some time to do so. What if the users register their own distinct public keys for the same username but in the two different public key stores? Trying to solve that requires either a fully centralized node or going into the dangerous territory of crypto bros (blockchains, i.e., some form of "majority" vote on which of the users is "allowed" to live on on).
Addendum: Yes we know that you think ml/hexbear/grad are tankies and or .world are a bunch of liberals but it gets old quickly. Try and come up with new material.
This is not the place to start flamewars between Lemmy, Mbin and Piefed.
Can you explain why exactly? Particular scenario would be helpful to understand your POV
Because you can't count on every instance playing by the rules. If anyone can set up an instance and authenticate any federated account, then they could also choose to impersonate me.
I won’t pretend I looked into authentication algorithm of every fedi apps but I doubt it’s “trust me bro” algorithm. Otherwise what would prevent malicious instance to post from your name today. Even if it’s some wacky algorithm it’s not a rocket science to enhance it. Message signing and public key sharing is one of common ways to solve this kind of problems. The only reason I see not to do it is lack of will or resources, or both
To explain why the comment below is correct, you are right that the other instance couldn't get your password. They don't need that to create a post/comment that is supposedly sent from an account though. Those aren't cryptographically signed or anything like that. It just says "this user sent this message".
I don't even think there is a way you could do this with some kind of cryptographic signature, unless it basically just sends an encrypted message to the home server and it verifies it, which then we have the same issue we started with of relying on a single server. I guess every message could be sent with a key, which can be disputed later. If the home server is unavailable, the message is sent, but it can later say that it's a forgery when it comes back online. It's not a perfect fix, but it's the only way this could even possibly work I think.
User registers at home server. Client generates pair of public and private keys, password provided by user during registration is used to encrypt (symmetrically) private key. Public and encrypted private keys stored on home server and then propagate over federation to other servers. Obviously propagation takes some time. Just like anything that uses ActivityPub (don’t know why I have to say it explicitly). Original private key not recorded anywhere. User initiates login on federated server. Federated server challenges user by providing encrypted private key and challenge phrase. User uses password to decrypt private key on client side and signs message with challenge phrase. Server uses public key to validate signature and phrase. User logged in. User creates signed post. All federated servers have copy of public key so they can check authenticity of origin of post.
I’m not saying it’s easy or perfect. I have no idea how feasible it is in current architecture. Probably there’s a smarter and more secure way to do it. I’m also not a team of security engineers who is getting paid to get this kind of things designed professionally.
My point is that, I think, it’s more of willingness issue than technical.
The only reason signatures work is because only your home instance can post as you. If you're saying you want any instance to be able to authenticate any user, even if all the rest of the fediverse is down, then you're eliminating that trust anchor (i.e., your home instance).
Currently, a malicious instance could pretend to post as any of ITS users, but NOT external users. The problem is if that instance is able to authenticate someone from a different instance, an you're suggesting. Then, they could post as that user and propagate that action through federation.
The only way this could work is if YOU as the user had a public/private key your on YOUR device(s). Then, any action made on your behalf could first be required to be signed LOCALLY on YOUR device.
Problems with that approach are: