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Time to get serious with E2E encrypted messaging
(techcrunch.com)
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No, it has not. A third party published it in an f-droid compatible repository. That might be convenient for someone who happens to trust that third party and manually add it to their F-Droid client, but it is not at all like it being added it to F-Droid.
This does not refute what I wrote. Unless you only communicate with people who get their Signal app from some non-Google source and they all rig up alternative push notification channels, or every one of them uses Signal exclusively on iOS, your conversations are still tied to Google. Perhaps you have so few contacts that you could achieve that, but most people are not in that position.
Encryption doesn't hide network traffic. Signal's centralised design means there is a single point where that traffic can be monitored and traced to reveal which endpoints are talking to each other, and where, and when.
What I wrote is not a lie, which you would know if you actually understood these issues. Please stop making baseless accusations. You are wrong, and you are being very rude.
If you're interested in correcting your ignorance, I suggest starting with this paper, which touches on some of the issues:
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/improving-signals-sealed-sender/
If the paper is too much for you, the linked video does a pretty good job of explaining.
Their github releases have the apk available so you can manually download it and install it or use obtainium.
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/releases
It's also available on their website btw: https://signal.org/android/apk/
That's simply false. Signal Notifications never include the content of the message or any metadata, no matter if they're sent over FCM, APN, WebSockets or UnifiedPush (via mollysocket). That wouldn't even be possible, since the Signal server sending out the notification doesn't even have the key to decrypt the message. Only the users involved in the conversation have the keys, that's how end-to-end encryption works. Signal simply sends an empty message via FCM (or any other push system), and the Signal app on your device then receives and decrypts the encrypted message and shows you a preview of the message content as a notification on your operating system.
And every build of the Signal client for WhatsApp also supports WebSockets as a fallback push notification system, in case Play services aren't installed or can't be reached. The only reason why FCM is used by default is that it saves some battery, because it only maintains one background network connection for all apps, instead of each app handling notifications themselves.
It's not false.
Signal's default, well-supported installations use Google services, so unless you're an extremely atypical user, those services are present on most of your contacts' devices. You might have the knowledge, skill, and motivation to remove those services from your own device, but since they're still present at the other end of most chats, you haven't escaped them.
Let's also remember that E2EE doesn't protect the endpionts, and that Google Play Services run with system-level privileges.
I would be more concerned about how phone-oriented it is. A phone's default OS is such spyware that I am not sure just what is safe from from being uploaded. And even if the person wants a more private alternative, most phones have locked bootloaders. On the other hand, Linux would run on damn near anything... But using Signal on it without a smartphone is very annoying. No way my mom would understand an Android VM or a command-line client, because the desktop client isn't feature-full and doesn't even allow registration.