Michael Kofman and Rob Lee released another article looking at the counteroffensive's overall state three months in. If you've been paying attention to Kofman's recent Russian Contingency podcasts, this article mostly echoes these conclusions, just packaged in a format more palatable to a Washington audience. If this is interesting to you, I would also recommend RUSI's recently released assessment of the counteroffensive. It's a bit more technical but equally informative.

Michael Kofman is a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on the Russian military and Eurasian security issues. He served as director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he conducted research on the capabilities, strategy, and military thought of the Russian Armed Forces.

Rob Lee is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program and a former Marine infantry officer

Attrition makes for poor headlines, but it plays to Ukraine’s strengths, whereas attempting to scale offensive maneuver under such difficult conditions does not. It is, however, burdensome to resource, pressuring Washington to finally authorize dual-purpose improved conventional munitions — cluster munitions for lack of artillery ammunition available. Cluster munitions are a nasty weapon with lingering effects, but there is no other way to sustain Ukraine’s demands for artillery ammunition. This was a critical decision, extending the timeline available to give Ukraine’s approach the opportunity to succeed. They are also more effective against forces in the open and manned trenches. But the dual-purpose improved conventional munition stockpile is not just meant for the offensive. It will be used to sustain Ukraine’s war effort well into next year, until Western production increases sufficiently. This suggests that the primary factors affecting Ukraine’s offensive could still be ammunition and force availability.

In mid-August, Ukraine appears to have begun committing elements from its reserves, including the 46th Airmobile and 82nd Air Assault Brigades. The addition of these units seems to have achieved quicker results, as Ukrainian forces liberated the heavily fortified town of Robotyne and continued to advance to the south and east. The current situation is fluid. Geolocated footage and reporting suggests Ukrainian forces, possibly a reconnaissance unit, have advanced past the anti-tank obstacles on the first part of the “Surovikin line” towards Verbove. Though it is unclear if this is just a small dismounted force, or if Ukraine has managed to breach those defenses with vehicles. Ukrainian forces have also advanced towards Novoprokopivka and its eastern flank. The Ukrainian military appears focused on further degrading the Russian defenses and widening the salient, because a narrow advance could leave its forces vulnerable to counterattacks on the flanks. The renewed assault does point to a changing dynamic, forcing the Russian military to react in order to try and stabilize the situation.

Despite appearances, Russia is not executing a true defense in depth. Russian forces are set up for such a defense, which enables a defender to degrade the attacker as they advance, trading space for attrition. They have constructed three defensive belts, minefields in between, communication trenches, and hardened defensive points in between. This was likely Gen. Sergei Surovikin’s vision (and his name provides the nickname for these defensive lines). But Surovikin is not in charge. Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, the chief of general staff, is. He has consistently demonstrated poor military judgment and a weak understanding of what Russian forces can and cannot do, most recently in the failed Russian winter offensive. Russian forces have chosen to defend forward of the Surovikin line, concentrating their efforts on holding the first line of defense and the towns that anchor it. To be clear, the first line does feature extensive entrenchments, including tunnel networks. The follow on lines include machine dug trenches, anti-tank ditches, dragons teeth, and likely more minefields. The Russian decision to defend forward has favored Kyiv because it allowed Ukrainian artillery to attrite the Russian units deployed.

The course of this battle is ... increasingly determined by who has the most reserves available and who pursues the best force management strategy over time.

Western support thus far has been sufficient to avert a Ukrainian defeat, and arguably has imposed a strategic defeat on Russia, but not enough to ensure a Ukrainian victory. Independent of the outcome of this offensive, Western countries need to be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a long war. Taken together, Western industrial and military potential greatly exceeds Russia’s, but without the political will, potential alone will not translate into results.

Basically the title. I would love to get at least a basic working knowledge of repairs and alterations, but I have no experience whatsoever. A “questions that don’t deserve their own post” or “starting resources” thing would be very helpful. Thank you!

Submission Statement

Western analysts have a strong bias towards conservative estimation, one so strong that it is frequently parodied in memes about the military-industrial complex. While the perils of overestimating one's capability are far greater than those of underestimation, underestimating does carry risks of its own. This article focuses on those risks within the context of wargaming and provides recommendations for better incorporating Western advantages and a more risk-tolerant mentality into wargames, conflict analysis, and procurement decisions. The author recommends recognizing and accounting for Western personnel advantages and incorporating acceptable levels of risk into wargame designs.

Lt. Cdr. Josh “Minkus” Portzer is a P-8A weapons and tactics instructor in the U.S. Navy. The views expressed here are his own.

In today’s wargaming, survivability is often a major currency through which a platform displays its value (expressed as relevancy) for future investments and growth within the defense budget. All military platforms have noteworthy capabilities. However, if an asset (such as a high-value plane) cannot get into an area without being destroyed, it is not seen as survivable. The concept of risk can offset the latent threat posed by a lack of survivability. The potential shootdown of a U.S. aircraft may, in general, be seen as unacceptable. Yet, if the commander is willing to accept risk, the threat of the shootdown may become tolerable. In that sense, risk can be a mitigator in the commander’s decision calculus when hedging against the question of survivability. Both concepts today feed an over-conservative characterization of the battlespace that has potential financial consequences.

There are many military wargames and conflict scenario simulations that are robust enough to circumnavigate these mentioned pitfalls. However, the inherent danger in the Department of Defense is that these wargaming-based studies can inform investment (or theoretically, divestment) decisions. In general, this is a good thing. U.S. taxpayers should want military business decisions to be sound ones, based on studies and modeled scenarios. However, when a lack of robustness in these studies manifests (perhaps due to accidental oversights, or a shortage of manning or time, or an absence of sophisticated modeling tools), a component service of the Department of Defense may make a misinformed business decision — albeit with good intentions of doing right by the taxpayer.

To return again to the aircraft versus missile example: If wargaming analysts retain their conservative bias towards unit-level risk and believe that the friendly aircraft is not survivable against the adversary missile, the analysts may find that the aircraft is not able to enter or adequately maneuver through the battlespace. If that is assumed to be true, then for a given anticipated conflict, the friendly aircraft may not be relevant. Now comes the survivability death spiral: If the friendly aircraft is not relevant in the next anticipated conflict, then why continue to invest in it by way of weapons, additional sensors, and other technology that may be outfitted on the platform? Alternative investment decisions then are made for other friendly platforms at the cost of the allegedly non-survivable aircraft.

Survivability and risk will forever be bedfellows of wargaming and conflict scenario analysis — as they should be. Conflict will inevitably bring with it losses, and no country should accept loss of life or materiel with reckless abandon. Making sound strategic operational and financial decisions means rigorously studying one’s own capabilities as well as the adversary’s. At risk of invoking a timeless cliché: “Know thyself. Know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.” Yet as a corollary of caution, another literary work comes to mind: Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote. On a quest for knighthood and in pursuit of chivalry, a comical Don Quixote fights imaginary enemies, notably making giants out of windmills. The phrase has become cemented idiomatically to represent waging conflict against exaggerated foes. It applies when one paints an enemy as 10 feet tall, but arguably, also when one paints oneself as 10 inches high. If viewing survivability through a peacetime lens of risk acceptance remains the status quo, the defense services run risk of tilting at windmills in several wargaming instances, some of which may induce the survivability death spiral for certain military assets.

By pursuing wargaming and modeling improvements that capture a more complete definition of survivability, and recalibrating how risk is defined therein, study conclusions will be more robust, accurate, and therefore more reliable. Moreover, those conclusions will optimize the investment decisions that the Department of Defense and component services make. In doing so, the chance of tilting at windmills is lessened. Conversely, the U.S. military may better invest in the pursuit of becoming giants.

The Exorcist: Deceiver is the second chapter of the upcoming The Exorcist trilogy.

Now to figure out how to work it LMAO

Combined the movies are playing like one big blockbuster. Really exciting to see this kind of success. Actually in line to see Barbie now!

Michael Kofman and Rob Lee released another episode of the Russian Contingency. This episode serves to broaden the focus away from the Zaporizhia offensive, focusing on sustainment, other fronts of the war, and some attempts to predict future developments. While I cannot share a publicly accessible version of this podcast, I have summarized some of the key takeaways below:

There is always a focus on large, high-tech items for equipping units of the formal Ukrainian army. But what Ukrainians need are low-tech, basic armored vehicles like the M113 for back-line roles. Similarly, units like the TDF and National Guard are often underequipped despite holding the front line against Russian armor just like regular army units. Quantity is very important for resolving both of these issues.

There are no wunderwaffen. Conflicts come down to force employment, force qualities, and force enablers--these are the sources of Ukrainian challenges so far.

Ukraine has had more success around Bakhmut, despite the presence of higher-quality Russian units there. Kofman mentions in particular the 31st Air Assault Brigade, which has apparently been pulled off the front lines. However, there are a large variety of Russian units in the area.

Bakhmut is like a punch bowl surrounded by high ground. Russia continues to hold some of this high ground, but Ukrainian advances have imperiled those. Russian entrenchments here are less elaborate than those in the south. Highly motivated and coordinated veteran units are the backbone of Ukraine's assault here.

Russian military's problems in the area began when they took Bakhmut. Wagner bore the brunt of the fighting to conquer the city, but Bakhmut is exceedingly difficult to defend as well. The reason it took Russia so long to do it was because of its failure to encircle the city with dismounted infantry(Kofman makes a direct comparison here between Russia's struggles in Vuhledar and Bakhmut and Ukraine's struggles in Zaporizhia). Russia is struggling to hold a defensively unfavorable location and losing higher-quality troops in the process.

Bakhmut was not a trap for Russian forces. Rather, this counteroffensive is simultaneously a fixing action and a manifestation of political objectives. In the process, however, Ukraine is attriting Russian airborne units, which have been seen as Moscow's strategic reserve in this conflict. Almost all of the naval infantry is on the southern front, and almost all of the airborne infantry/VDV are on the eastern front.

Attrition rate is overall favorable for Ukraine(interesting comparison to yesterday's episode, where Rob mentioned that Ukraine was likely taking heavier losses than Russia was in the south). However, Russia has a lot of artillery fires, and these fires are being concentrated on Ukrainian advances. The key issue is generating and sustaining momentum while taking attrition.

Wagner mutiny further increases political importance of Bakhmut. Wagner and supporters would be empowered by further Ukrainian advances in the area.

Ukrainians may need to commit further resources in order to continue advancing. Both sides may end up too attrited to continue further offensive operations in the area.

Steady pace of dismissals of Russian commanders may be relevant as Russia increasingly begins to look towards a rotation. Rotation of units could substantially affect their ability to defend as units are replaced with less experienced, mobilized personnel who may be less familiar with the terrain. In addition, some units from the south will likely have to be diverted to Bakhmut. However, the south will continue to be heavily defended. Ukraine's strategy of advancing on three fronts creates pressure, forces Russia to make choices, and eventually may lead to a breakthrough. Taking Bakhmut itself does not lead to much.

Dealing with attrition and recovering force quality are key battlefield enablers. Key aspect of this is making the choice to attrite or preserve units in the first place, as with Ukraines original choice to defend Bakhmut. One argument one could make is that this denied Ukraine the ability to take veterans from those brigades and deploy them in the south. The moment Russia took Bakhmut, however, the balance shifted, and now Bakhmut is an opportunity for Ukraine to inflict attrition on Russian units. Territorial movements may be modest but offensive may succeed in sapping Russian capabilities for offensive action in the future.

In the South, mix of units, including Storm Z, mobilized, naval infantry, Spesnatz, etc. Attrition to some of these groups is more sustainable than others. Hard to assess who is taking attrition from OSINT. Ukraine has an advantage in tube artillery, Russia has an advantage in rocket artillery. Russian advances may be stymied by lack of artillery overmatch.

Ukraine has enough artillery shells for this offensive--but what about after. US and EU have not scaled up ammunition production sufficiently to match Ukraine's monthly use rate. Ukrainian has been supplied from stockpiles, but that is not an infinite resource. Artillery ammunition supplies may be the most important facet of this war for both sides.

Russian fires will also be restricted as their stockpiles run out. Kofman makes a "wild" guess at Russia being able to produce about a million artillery shells of their most common caliber per year. This will dramatically constrict their rates of fires. Ukrainian fires cannot come from quantity, they have to make up the difference in quality.

Ukrainian infantry are pound-for-pound better than Russian infantry up to the company level. As long as they have the supplies, they will outperform expectations. That hasn't been the case in the past five weeks of the offensive. Russia is fighting more competently than before.

Pressure to negotiate comes up against the questions of with who and what. Russia has shown no signs that they are willing to negotiate. Russia is unlikely to give up any of the territory it has formally annexed, and Ukraine has no reason to consider accepting that. A premature peace may just be an interlude until a second war breaks out. Battlefield developments have not led either side to feel like they need to make concessions. This is already a long war, and it's likely to go on, even after the decisive phase of war has passed.

Military sustainment and Western will are critical. Ukrainians will take any vehicles at all. Even Toyota Hiluxes will do, but extra protection is in particularly short supply. Much of this is out of Ukraine's control. Every time Ukraine has had to retreat, it has been because of Russian fires dominance. As long Ukraine has supplies of artillery shells, further Russian advances will remain unlikely.

DPICMs have risks, but they are particularly good for disrupting Russian armor concentrations.

Be careful of anecdotal evidence. Mobilization has resulted in a flurry of embarrassing stories for Russia--video appeals, mass shootings, etc. But mobilization also saved Russia's position in this war and allowed them to hold their lines. Without it, they may have lost by now. Hopes that Russian forces would collapse despite all the negative reports. Despite horrific anecdotes about mobilization, minimal domestic pressure to end the war. Domestic upheaval is possible and would have major impacts on the war.

NATO/US must take a longer view of things. War will likely go on for 1 or more years. May be good to pull veterans off the front lines and send them abroad for better training.

Shoigu and Gerasimov have not done particularly well and do not command much respect in the Russian military. One of the side effects of the mutiny is that Putin cares more about loyalty than before. Seliverstov was removed despite his competence, possibly because he worked closely with Wagner, and therefore his loyalty was under dispute. Russia has generally moved to more competent commanders through this war, but the coup attempt threatens to reverse that trend. Surovikin is arguably responsible for Russian success--if he had not been in charge, its possible Russia would have fared far worse. Now his position is in jeopardy. Loss of competence in favor of loyalty is a long-term factor for Russia.

This offensive has not failed. Ukrainian military has a theory of success and will fight it the way they know best from this point forward. It will stretch out through and beyond the summer. To the extent that the West can sustain and provide the support they need, it will have real impacts.

More episodes coming soon with other members of the team that traveled to Zaporizhia.

The Russia contingency has posted a special 2-part episode . Part One can be found here and is publicly available. Part Two is available only to War on the Rocks members, but I have summarized key takeaways below. I recommend listening to Part One first, then reading through Part Two for the in-depth analysis.

Key Takeways

The counteroffensive was practically prosecuted by company-sized elements. This resulted from the Ukrainian military's struggles with coordinating actions above the battalion level. The military tends to rely on sequencing rather than coordination and struggles to deal with setbacks.

Dearth of experienced officers and veterans as a result of losses and massive expansion of the army. Leaders were unwilling to give up valuable personnel for staffing the new brigades. Stars who did go came with drawbacks of their own--see 47th Brigade. New brigades struggled to attract talent due to these factors.

Need to take a critical look at the idea of standing up wholly new brigades as opposed to having continued to work and train within existing forces. More experienced brigades have shown better results than newer force organizations across all three theaters. The jury is still out on the new brigades, but the concept needs scrutiny.

"You go to war with the army you have", but you also have to use the army you have, not the army you would like to have. Ukraine relies on artillery fires to enable their maneuver. Trying to adapt to a radically different doctrine put the Ukrainian military in a difficult position. Western maneuver doctrine has advantages but does not necessarily work for Ukraine given what they have available.

Pulling back veterans for counteroffensive training, then supplementing them with newer troops as support would have been a better strategy, even if doing so means pulling out of Bakhmut quicker.

The early hours of the counteroffensive were crucial--most artillery, least prepared Russian forces, etc., etc. Veteran brigades might have been able to push through the stumbling blocks that derailed the newer personnel that were at the tip of the spear.

Rob Lee offers a bit of nuance to a surprisingly unambiguous Kofman. There is no risk-free option here. If Ukraine had tried to pull back veteran units over the winter, there's a real possibility that they would have lost more terrain elsewhere.

This is a very good Russian defense. Even with veteran brigades and fully equipped troops, it's not clear that the counteroffensive could have reached all the way to Melitopol, or even to the main defensive line. No guarantee the alternative would

Back to Kofman. Against such a prepared defense, a combined arms offensive was unlikely to succeed without enabling factors like air superiority. In fact, even most Western militaries lack the resources to perform such an operation without the US leading the way in the integrating role.

The offensive is far from over. Just because the initial offensive was unsuccessful, doesn't mean the whole offensive will be a failure. New brigades have combat experience, will make changes. There is going to be tactical adaptation.

Ukrainian fighting is dependent on infantry advances. Platform-based demining is less important than man-portable demining equipment. Present Ukrainian techniques clear narrow lanes that choke logistics and cannot permit vehicles. Infantry systems like APOBs would be much more effective and efficient.

Current fires are not meant to pull apart command and control, though some Storm Shadows have been used to that effect Attrition has worked for Ukraine in the past. and it may work here.

Don't expect mechanized maneuver to make a sudden appearance anytime soon. Ukrainian tankers have learned that massing armor is a lethal mistake. Most tanks on both sides are used in indirect fire and infantry support roles. Anti-tank roles are carried out by infantry and artillery. Tanks operate in pairs, one firing and the other providing overwatch and support. Tank brigades seem to be nascent and not present in this fight. Even a substantial breakthrough will struggle to gain momentum. Western expectations of how Ukraine will employ its forces don't align with Ukrainian takeaways from the last year and a half of war.

Rob Lee: Relative attritional balances are hard to predict from OSINT data. The side on the offensive tends to take heavier losses and that is likely true in this case, but open source data on losses shows clear successes in Ukrainian counterbattery and high-value targeting. Ukrainian ability to field UAVs behind Russian lines is a positive sign. But a significant breakthrough is far from guaranteed.

Russia has enough UAVs to maintain constant overwatch of the frontline. Able to interdict masses of armor. Lower fires does not necessarily mean Russia is running out of shells--they are holding them in reserve for when they see the most threat.

Terrain is very good for observation and therefore long-range ATGMs. Russian helicopters and glide bombs are another pain point.

Infantry advances reduce casualties, but slow everything down. Places a heavy burden on individual soldiers due to the inability for vehicles to penetrate with infantry. 47th Brigade has begun advancing after pivoting to infantry advance, but this is measured in hundreds of meters.

The major constraint is artillery ammunition. If there is not a quick enough advance, Ukraine will run out of shells before they reach their objectives.

Ukraine continues to hold an advantage in small squad tactics.

Kofman: DPICMs are all about the numbers. Buys the Ukrainian army time to fight into the fall. Sense is that Ukrainians are determined, learning. They are nasty weapons, but there is no other stockpile to be given to Ukraine.

Just because the West stops giving Ukraine the capacity to stop the war, does not mean that Russia will suddenly stop the war. If anything, they will try to press their advantage even harder. The position that Ukraine should get Western support until the first unsuccessful offensive does not make any sense.

Ukraine needs nightfighting capabilities, man-portable capabilities, and to push those things all the way down, even to units that may not be part of the traditional army structure like National Guard.

Ends by recommending a series of articles that Kofman has also shared here.

Submission statement

There has been a significant amount of consternation about Chinese shipbuilding capacity versus American yards. While part of the issue arises from the cost of materials and labor and protectionist policies, another major cause is the diminished and erratic pace of naval ship acquisition. The end of the Cold War and shift to the prosecution of land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to cutbacks in naval acquisition, leaving contractors in the lurch. Now, as the Navy attempts to ramp up acquisition, it is finding that the capacity it requires simply no longer exists. This article speaks to the urgency of the Navy’s efforts to build up, as well as the difficulties lying before it, not least continuing restraints on expenditure such as those imposed by the debt ceiling compromise negotiated earlier this year.

Sam LaGrone is the editor of USNI News. He has covered legislation, acquisition and operations for the Sea Services since 2009 and spent time underway with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the Canadian Navy.

The Navy is now more than 80 ships short of the latest estimate of what the sea service thinks it needs to fulfill the Biden administration’s national security strategy.

The Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement, a congressionally-mandated report, requires 381 ships, up from 373 in the 2022 report, the first year it was released. As of Monday, the Navy’s battle force was 299 ships.

More recently, the Navy has been more reluctant to be as bold and public about what it needs, naval analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News.

“There’s a big question on why not be public on the number,” he said. “The Navy has been in the mode to obscure what it needs to do because they are under budgetary constraints and can’t meet those goals.”