Counterpoint, from a complex systems perspective:

We don't fully know or are able toodel the details of neurochemistry, but we know some essential features which we can model, action potentials in spiking neuron models for example.

It's likely that the details don't actually matter much. Take traffic jams as an example. There is lots of details going on, driver psychology, the physical mechanics of the car etc. but you only need a handful of very rough parameters to reproduce traffic jams in a computer.

That's the thing with "emergent" phenomena, they are less complicated than the sum of their parts, which means you can achieve the same dynamics using other parts.

We don't even know what consciousness is, let alone if it's technically "real" (as in physical in any way.) It's perfectly possible an uploaded brain would be just as conscious as a real brain because there was no physical thing making us conscious, and rather it was just a result of our ability to think at all.
Similarly, I've heard people argue a machine couldn't feel emotions because it doesn't have the physical parts of the brain that allow that, so it could only ever simulate them. That argument has the same hole in that we don't actually know that we need those to feel emotions, or if the final result is all that matters. If we replaced the whole "this happens, release this hormone to cause these changes in behavior and physical function" with a simple statement that said "this happened, change behavior and function," maybe there isn't really enough of a difference to call one simulated and the other real. Just different ways of achieving the same result.

My point is, we treat all these things, consciousness, emotions, etc, like they're special things that can't be replicated, but we have no evidence to suggest this. It's basically the scientific equivalent of mysticism, like the insistence that free will must exist even though all evidence points to the contrary.

Consciousness might not even be “attached” to the brain. We think with our brains but being conscious could be a separate function or even non-local.

I think we're going to learn how to mimic a transfer of consciousness before we learn how to actually do one. Basically we'll figure out how to boot up a new brain with all of your memories intact. But that's not actually a transfer, that's a clone. How many millions of people will we murder before we find out the Zombie Zuckerberg Corp was lying about it being a transfer?

This just makes it more realistic

Hey, just be glad I changed it from asdf_test_3, okay?

Just FYI content warning for Pantheon there is a seriously disturbing gore/kill scene that is animated too well in the first season. Anyone who has seen the show knows what scene I am talking about, I found the scene pretty upsetting and I almost didn't finish the show. I am still a little upset that the scene is burned in my memory.

Sounds good. Did it come to a conclusion or get axed mid way?

Yes, I immediately thought about SOMA after reading the post. recommendations++

Soma is so fucking bleak and I love it

Who the fuck uses comic sans for programming? I use comic mono.

If I remember right, the game The Talos Principle calls that the Talos principle

The tv show Pantheon figures it will work, but it will be very disturbing.

Right? Like what if as cells die or degrade instead of being replaced by the body naturally they are replaced by nanites/cybernetics/tech magic. If the process of fully converting took place over the course of 10 years, then I don't see how the subject would even notice.

It's an interesting thing to ponder.

Welcome to Life

Plottwist: consciousness is : Copy

#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct Consciousness {...}

fn upload_brain(brain: Consciousness) -> Result<(), Error>

Guys probably talking about